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Abstract—Intrusion detection has become one of the most
critical tasks in a wireless network to prevent service outages
that can take long to fix. The sheer variety of anomalous events
necessitates adopting cognitive anomaly detection methods
instead of the traditional signature-based detection techniques.
This paper proposes an anomaly detection methodology for
wireless systems that is based on monitoring and analyzing radio
frequency (RF) spectrum activities. Our detection technique
leverages an existing solution for the video prediction problem,
and uses it on image sequences generated from monitoring
the wireless spectrum. The deep predictive coding network is
trained with images corresponding to the normal behavior of
the system, and whenever there is an anomaly, its detection is
triggered by the deviation between the actual and predicted
behavior. For our analysis, we use the images generated from
the time-frequency spectrograms and spectral correlation
functions of the received RF signal. We test our technique on a
dataset which contains anomalies such as jamming, chirping of
transmitters, spectrum hijacking, and node failure, and evaluate
its performance using standard classifier metrics: detection
ratio, and false alarm rate. Simulation results demonstrate that
the proposed methodology effectively detects many unforeseen
anomalous events in real time. We discuss the applications,
which encompass industrial IoT, autonomous vehicle control
and mission-critical communications services.
Index Terms - anomaly detection, machine learning, deep
predictive coding network
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless technology enables many services and applications
and will play a key role for enabling the smart and autonomous
systems of the future. Wireless networks also provide mission-
critical infrastructure for public safety, national security, and
military communications. This popularity of wireless technol-
ogy can be attributed to its ease of access and high availability;
however, these very same features contribute to many of
its vulnerabilities. Attacks such as jamming, spoofing, and
eavesdropping have existed since the early days of analog
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systems, and despite important advances enabled by digital
technology, they continue to exist in today’s and emerging
wireless networks [1]–[5]. The openness of wireless standards
and the inherently open wireless channel can be exploited by
adversaries in the reconnaissance and exploitation phases of
the cyber kill chain [6] to launch cyber attacks.
Despite continuous progress in managing cyber risks, the
development of cyber security measures cannot keep up with
the growth rate and diversity of cyber attacks [7]. Preventive
security measures are ineffective against unforeseen or zero-
day attacks. Furthermore, adversaries can surpass preventive
measures by finding vulnerabilities associated with design im-
perfections, implementation errors, or incorrect configurations
[8]. Thus, it is a well accepted fact that the anticipation and
prevention of all possible attacks and malfunctions are not
feasible for current or future cyber-physical systems [9].
Once a system is attacked by an adversary, the first step in
its recovery process is to determine the existence of a system
anomaly [10]. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are critical
components of the security infrastructure and are specifically
designed for this purpose. Their primary goal is to collect and
analyze system information to detect the presence of malicious
activity. This detection is essential because it is the basis for
triggering subsequent remediation steps that localize, isolate,
and mitigate the threat. However, this initial step is by itself
challenging.
The constantly evolving threats and rapid development of
new attack patterns render the commercially popular signature-
based IDS (e.g. OpenWIPS-ng, Suricata) ineffective as their
detection scheme is only as good as their database of stored
signatures. The other alternative—anomaly detection based
IDS—are better suited for handling unknown attacks. In order
to identify anomalies, they just need to know the normal
behavior of the system, and whenever a significant deviation
from that reference is observed, an intrusion is reported. For
wireless networks, the sheer variety of possible anomalous
events necessitates adoption of anomaly detection based IDS.
Anomaly detection techniques can be classified based on the
layer of the protocol stack from which they derive the data. In
order to detect attacks such as PHY layer jamming, spectrum
hijacking, or MAC address spoofing, an analysis of lower layer
attributes—physical (PHY) and data link layer attributes—is
required. We are motivated by this requirement and propose
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a machine learning (ML) based anomaly detection technique
which analyzes RF spectral data of a wireless network.
This paper introduces:
1) An anomaly detection scheme which enables automated
and non-intrusive real-time monitoring of RF signals,
and
2) A methodology that leverages powerful video prediction
tools for anomaly detection in wireless networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II formulates the problem and summarizes related work.
Section III introduces our methodology. Implementation de-
tails and performance evaluation are provided in Section IV.
We conclude the paper in Section V with a discussion on
applications and an outline for future research.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED WORK
Many emerging applications such as smart cities and the
smart grid require heavy deployment of wireless devices for
their realization. Attacks or anomalous behavior in these sys-
tems can have severe consequences and their detection requires
automated monitoring of huge amounts of data, which can be
handled only by ML techniques. The diversity of anomalies in
wireless system makes it impossible to obtain their signatures
[11]. Furthermore, IDS for wireless networks have information
available only from the physical and the data link layers [12]
as the information present in higher layers are often encrypted
and therefore not easily accessible. The problem then consists
of developing a methodology for effective signal monitoring
and processing, while being adaptable enough to accommodate
unknown threats in the future.
Reference [13] proposes a data-mining based approach
to identify anomalies in temporal-spectral data. The method
creates historical models from the previously recorded data
and compares real-time measurements with these models. Our
method follows a similar approach, but instead of saving
the entire past data, we just train the ML module with
a normal-behavior dataset. Thus, our method can be much
faster as compared to [13]. The authors of [14] propose two
anomaly detection methods using information theoretic mea-
sures: Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) and information
content. They statistically analyze the signal envelope to create
empirical event probabilities and use it with the two measure
functions to identify interference instances. Reference [12]
proposes a detection scheme to identify anomalous behavior
in IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN by analyzing MAC layer
frames. The authors create a normal model using n consecutive
state-machine transitions during the normal functioning of the
network. At runtime, their IDS identifies anomalous sessions
based on the similarity between the real-time traffic and
the pre-trained normal model. A discrete wavelet transform
(DWT) based method of anomaly detection is proposed in
[15] to identify anomalies in wireless sensor network (WSN)
traffic. The network traffic is there preprocessed with Snort
and the resultant features undergo DWT to decompose the
energy into different sub-bands. These energy coefficients of
the normal traffic behavior are used as a reference to compare
against real-time traffic features in order to identify anomalies.
The authors of [11] propose an unsupervised learning ap-
proach for RF spectrum-based anomaly detection in wireless
communications based on a two-layered autoencoder. They
consider a one-class classification problem to recognize a
signal with high signal-to-noise ration (SNR). This approach
is limited to a specific kind of anomaly and does not address
wider classes of anomalies. Similar to our approach, [16] uses
2D image representations of the wide-band time-frequency
spectrograms for detection, localization and identification
of radio transmissions using convolutional neural networks
(CNN). However, their solution does not address the anomaly
detection problem.
Reference [17] demonstrates the efficacy of recurrent neural
network architectures for RF anomaly detection. It analyzes
raw spectral data using CNN based Long Short Term Mem-
ory (LSTM) networks and characterizes the prediction error
as a Gaussian distribution. The approach performs well in
structured radio environments by detecting deviations from the
structured behavior. We approach the RF anomaly detection
problem using a deep predictive coding network, which has
shown better results than traditional solutions [18].
Fig. 1: Block diagram of our system. The proposed anomaly detector
sits at the sink node or base station where RF spectrum monitoring
is carried out.
III. METHODOLOGY
We consider the spectrum monitoring application for the
uplink channel of a wireless network as shown in Fig. 1.
The anomaly detector module is located at a sink node or
the base station which monitors the spectrum. In addition to
the legitimate nodes, malicious nodes may also be present.
At the sink node, the time-domain data is processed in real
time and converted to frequency-domain data using the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) and the Spectral Correlation Function
(SCF) before being stored in the form of sequential 2D image
representations as shown in Fig. 2.
Our anomaly detector module takes these image sequences
as the input and feeds them to a deep learning video predictor,
such as Prednet [18], which tries to predict the next frame of
a video based on the past frames. We pre-train the weights
frequency
Frame 1 Frame 3Frame 2
time
Frame 1 Frame 3Frame 2
α
frequency
(a) Sequential image frames for the time-frequency spectrogram
of a two-node wireless network. Each image captures the spectral
behavior over a finite time duration.
frequency
Frame 1 Frame 3Frame 2
time
Frame 1 Frame 3Frame 2
α
frequency
(b) Sequential image frames representing the spectral correlation
function of the signal of a wireless network. Each frame captures
the spectral behavior for a particular time instant.
Fig. 2: Sample input sequence for the video predictor module.
t
Fig. 3: Division of the spectrogram image into an m × n grid.
Statistics of the absolute difference in the pixel values of the predicted
and actual frame are compared for each block.
of the deep predictive coding network with image sequences
corresponding to the network’s normal operation. This enables
the neural network to make predictions and detect anomalies
that deviate from normal network conditions. More precisely,
the predictor compares the output predictions of each image
frame with the image of the actual spectrum behavior using
an approach similar to [16]. The comparison is done by
segmenting each of the frames into an m×n grid as shown in
Fig. 3 and calculating the mean absolute error for each block
of the grid. These error values can be modeled as a stochastic
distribution and we use a Gaussian distribution in this paper.
During the training process, we correspondingly save the
expected error statistics for the normal network behavior to
evaluate the likelihood of the mean prediction error for each
grid segment. The cumulative likelihood for each of the frames
is then used to identify anomalies.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Implementation Details
In order to test our method, we implement a three-node
network with two source nodes and one sink node. The source
nodes share a 500 kHz channel using time division multiple
access (TDMA). The source nodes are transmitting BPSK
symbols and the transmitted signal is corrupted by Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). A sample image of spectrum
of this system is shown in Fig. 2a. Our anomaly detector
module is located at a sink node which monitors the spectrum
and receives the signals transmitted by the network nodes
at SNR values > 5 dB. In order to work at lower SNR,
approaches such as [19], [20] can be used to preprocess the
signal. The network implementation and data collection is
done using GNU Radio Companion.
In our implementation, we use the two transforms: time-
frequency spectrogram and SCF. The spectrogram is computed
using the GNU Radio QTGUI waterfall block. The SCF is
computed using the FFT accumulation method (FAM) [21],
and is implemented in the GNU Radio module gr-specest [22]
as
Sαxx(n, f) =
1
N
N∑
r=1
1
N ′
XN ′(n, f + α/2)X
∗
N ′(n, f − α/2).
(1)
The FAM algorithm generates a bi-frequency plane, with cycle
frequency α as one axis. The cycle frequency resolution is
fs
P×L , where fs is the sampling rate, L the data chunk size
of the first FFT and P the size of the second FFT [21]. We
use the gr-inspector visualization tool to generate SCF images
[23].
As mentioned, our anomaly detection module uses the video
prediction network Prednet [18], which is a deep predictive
coding neural network. It is designed as a multilevel arrange-
ment of local predictors, each of which comprises of an input
convolution layer, recurrent representation layer, and an error
representation layer. At each level, the recurrent representation
layer uses inputs from its own error representation as well
as from representation layers from levels above it. Thus the
information flow among different levels is top-down, making it
equivalent to a generative deconvolutional layer. The network
is trained using the back-propagation algorithm. For our sim-
ulations, we use a three-level network whose representation
layers consist of 48, 96, and 192 channels respectively. The
filters of the convolutional layer are of size (3, 3, 3).
Two separate neural networks are tuned and trained for
spectrograms and SCF images with dataset which only consist
of images corresponding to the normal-behavior of the system.
The detectors were trained for 20 and 40 epochs respectively,
and the training time for each epoch was 23 s with a IBM
Power8 CPU (3.26 GHz, 256 GB memory) and NVIDIA P100
GPU (16 GB memory). The image sequences are evaluated
with respect to the trained neural networks.
(a) Normal behavior (b) Single chirping node (c) Two nodes chirping (d) Spectrum hijacking
(e) Node failure (f) Barrage jamming (g) Sweep jamming (h) Tone jamming
Fig. 4: Example spectrogram image frames from the dataset showing different anomalies used for evaluating our method.
B. Results
We define several anomalies—chirp, spectrum hijacking,
node failure, barrage jamming, sweep jamming, and tone
jamming—in our dataset to evaluate the performance of our
method. Sample spectrogram images corresponding to these
anomalies are shown in Fig. 4. We use standard binary
classification metrics: detection rate and false alarm rate.
Fig. 5 shows the raw output of our anomaly detector when
it uses spectrogram data alongside with the anomaly indicator
function in the testing dataset. It can be observed that when
an anomaly occurs in the network, the average slope of the
detector output increases with a high rate. This steady increase
in the slope continues while the anomaly stays in the network.
After the anomalous event the detector’s output gradually
goes back to its steady state. Thus, the detector can track
the anomaly by observing the slope of its output or error
likelihood value, and its detection ratio and false alarm rate is a
function of the set threshold for the slope. Fig. 7a displays this
relationship and was obtained by varying the threshold value
for the slope of the error likelihood output of the detector. The
figure also shows how the SNR affects the performance of the
detector. We can say that accurate detection is possible at high
SNR and degrades for lower SNR using the spectrogram-based
detector.
Next, we analyze the performance of our detector on the
dataset containing SCF images. Fig. 6 shows sample outputs
of the SCF image-based detector for five different anomalous
RF events. The detector performance can be compared with the
ground truth or actual anomaly indicator function plot (shown
on the left side in each subfigure). We observe that in most of
the cases, the error value obtained by our detector increases
almost instantly as the anomaly occurs. This is so because each
frame of the input SCF image reflects instantaneous spectral
behavior. In order to process this error likelihood curve, we
simply need to set a threshold value for the error curve and
an anomaly is detected if the error likelihood exceeds this
threshold. The tradeoff relationship between detection ratio
and the false alarm rate is shown in Fig. 7b. It shows that
nearly 100% detection accuracy can be obtained for high SNR
and 90% for medium SNRs at false alarms rate of 0.15.
If we compare the two detectors, we observe the following:
1) The spectrogram based detector requires analysis of
multiple image frames to decide the presence of an
anomaly, whereas the SCF-based detector reacts instan-
taneously. This difference in behavior of the two detec-
tors can be attributed to the fact that spectrogram image
frames contain information for a fixed time window, and
the adjacent images in the dataset are highly correlated.
Hence, the spectrogram based detector cannot localize
anomalies in time domain as accurately as the SCF-
based detector.
2) Spectrogram based detectors, on the other hand, can
afford to skip processing of adjacent image frames,
which makes them useful for monitoring applications
when the available computational resources are limited.
Example scenarios would be IoT networks or a battery
constrained systems, such as WSNs.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed a ML-based anomaly detection
approach for identifying abnormal events in wireless networks.
In our method, we monitor real-time wireless signals, process
them continuously to obtain power spectral density and SCF
video frames. These videos are then passed to the video frame
predictor PredNet, which iteratively processes each frame to
predict the network’s behavior in the next frame. Our detector
analyzes the deviation of the predicted frame from the actual
network behavior to identify the presence of an anomalous
event.
We have trained the video predictor with video frames that
correspond to the normal behavior of a network. This way our
detection approach can identify unforeseen network anoma-
lies that have different RF signatures. We illustrate this by
evaluating our approach against various anomalies, including
jamming, spectral hijacking, and chirp signaling. Further, we
analyze the detection ratio vs. false alarm rate tradeoff for
(a) Single node chirping (b) Two chirping nodes
(c) Barrage Jamming (d) Sweep Jammer
(e) Spectrum Hijacking
Fig. 5: Performance of our anomaly detector on spectrogram image frames for different anomaly scenarios. For each subfigure, the left side
plots the ground truth of anomalous event occurrence over time and the right side plots the detector’s error metric.
our detector on two types of spectral datasets: time-frequency
plots of power spectral density and cyclostationary profiles of
the signal. Because of the high correlation among consecutive
spectrogram images, the first detector cannot instantaneously
detect an anomaly. With the SCF dataset, on the other hand, the
localization of anomalies is more accurate and instantaneous.
The performance gain of the SCF-image based detector comes
at the cost of higher computational requirement to generate the
SCF.
The proposed anomaly detection methodology can cater de-
mands of networks with variable constraints and requirements.
Our approach is scalable to networks with a large number
of devices, such as massive machine-type communications in
sensor networks, industry automation and the smart grid, to
name a few.
We are currently analyzing the implications of differ-
ent wireless network architectures, consider hyper-parameter
searches, evaluate longer runs, larger datasets and additional
types of anomalies and combinations of anomalies. More
robustness in the detection can be achieved by ML techniques
that process multiple transforms of the raw data or prepro-
cessed data.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was partially supported by NSF through grant
1265886 and by the industrial affiliates of the Broadband
Wireless Access and Applications Center. The authors would
also like to thank Dr. Bert Huang, whose course gave them an
opportunity to work on this project.
REFERENCES
[1] V. Marojevic, R. M. Rao, S. Ha, and J. H. Reed, “Performance analysis
of a mission-critical portable lte system in targeted rf interference,” in
IEEE 86th Veh. Tech. Conf. (VTC-Fall), pp. 1–6, Sept 2017.
[2] M. Lichtman, R. P. Jover, M. Labib, R. Rao, V. Marojevic, and J. H.
Reed, “LTE/LTE-A jamming, spoofing, and sniffing: threat assessment
and mitigation,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 54–61, 2016.
[3] M. Labib, V. Marojevic, J. H. Reed, and A. I. Zaghloul, “How to
enhance the immunity of LTE systems against RF spoofing,” in Int.
Conf. Comput., Networking and Commun. (ICNC), pp. 1–5, Feb 2016.
[4] D. Rupprecht, A. Dabrowski, T. Holz, E. Weippl, and C. Po¨pper, “On
security research towards future mobile network generations,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.08932, 2017.
[5] M. Lichtman, R. Rao, V. Marojevic, J. Reed, and R. P. Jover, “5G NR
jamming, spoofing, and sniffing: threat assessment and mitigation,” in
1st IEEE Workshop on 5G Wireless Security, pp. 1–6, May 2018.
[6] L. Martin, “Cyber kill chain R©,” URL: http://cyber. lockheedmartin.
com/hubfs/Gaining the Advantage Cyber Kill Chain. pdf, 2014.
[7] P. Cornish, D. Livingstone, D. Clemente, and C. Yorke, On Cyber
Warfare. Chatham House London, 2010.
[8] Z. Yu and J. J. Tsai, Intrusion detection: a machine learning approach.
World Scientific, 2011.
[9] I. Linkov, D. A. Eisenberg, K. Plourde, T. P. Seager, J. Allen, and
A. Kott, “Resilience metrics for cyber systems,” Environment Systems
and Decisions, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 471–476, 2013.
[10] E. J. Colbert and S. Hutchinson, “Intrusion Detection in Industrial
Control Systems,” in Cyber-security of SCADA and Other Industrial
Control Systems, pp. 209–237, Springer, 2016.
(a) Single node chirping (b) Two chirping nodes
(c) Barrage Jamming (d) Sweep Jammer
(e) Spectrum Hijacking
Fig. 6: Performance of our anomaly detector on SCF image frames for different anomaly scenarios. For each subfigure, the
left side plots the ground truth of anomalous event occurance over time and the right side plots the detector’s error metric.
(a) Detector’s performance with spectrogram images. (b) Detector’s performance with SCF images.
Fig. 7: Detection ratio over false alarm rate for the two proposed detectors.
[11] Q. Feng, Y. Zhang, C. Li, Z. Dou, and J. Wang, “Anomaly detection
of spectrum in wireless communication via deep auto-encoders,” The
Journal of Supercomputing, vol. 73, no. 7, pp. 3161–3178, 2017.
[12] H. Alipour, Y. B. Al-Nashif, P. Satam, and S. Hariri, “Wireless anomaly
detection based on IEEE 802.11 behavior analysis,” IEEE transactions
on information forensics and security, vol. 10, no. 10, pp. 2158–2170,
2015.
[13] S. Yin, S. Li, and J. Yin, “Temporal-spectral data mining in anomaly
detection for spectrum monitoring,” in Wireless Communications, Net-
working and Mobile Computing (WiCom’09), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2009.
[14] M. Afgani, S. Sinanovic´, and H. Haas, “The Information Theoretic Ap-
proach to Signal Anomaly Detection for Cognitive Radio,” International
Journal of Digital Multimedia Broadcasting, vol. 2010, 2010.
[15] Ł. Saganowski, T. Andrysiak, R. Kozik, and M. Choras´, “DWT-based
anomaly detection method for cyber security of wireless sensor net-
works,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 9, no. 15, pp. 2911–
2922, 2016.
[16] T. J. O’Shea, T. C. Clancy, and R. W. McGwier, “Recurrent Neural
Radio Anomaly Detection,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.00301, 2016.
[17] T. J. O’Shea, T. Roy, and T. Erpek, “Spectral detection and localization
of radio events with learned convolutional neural features,” in Signal
Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), 2017 25th European, pp. 331–335,
IEEE, 2017.
[18] W. Lotter, G. Kreiman, and D. Cox, “Deep predictive coding net-
works for video prediction and unsupervised learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1605.08104, 2016.
[19] C. Lee and D. B. Williams, “A preprocessing approach to improve
noise reduction for chaotic signals,” Physics Letters A, vol. 200, no. 3-4,
pp. 289–294, 1995.
[20] S. Jafari, S. H. Golpayegani, and A. Jafari, “A novel noise reduction
method based on geometrical properties of continuous chaotic signals,”
Scientia Iranica, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 1837–1842, 2012.
[21] R. S. Roberts, W. A. Brown, and H. H. Loomis, “Computationally
efficient algorithms for cyclic spectral analysis,” IEEE Signal Processing
Magazine, vol. 8, pp. 38–49, April 1991.
[22] F. Wunsch, “gr-specest: A module adding spectral estimation routines
to gnuradio.” https://github.com/kit-cel/gr-specest.git, 2016.
[23] S. Muller, “gnuradio/gr-inspector.” https://github.com/gnuradio/
gr-inspector, 2017.
